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Abstract: This article aims to study the New Public 
Management (NPM), one of the main trends 
associated to neoliberalism. It studies governance 
to show its general, wider and abstract scope. It also 
focuses on the Rational Choice as an important theory 
about governance, a basis for NPM. And it observes 
the neoliberal foundations of NPM, showing critical 
aspects of its real practice. Methodology: hypothetical-
deductive method of research, with a qualitative 
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and critical approach and bibliographic-documental 
research technique. As results of this research, we 
can conclude that: i) the ideological usage of NPM 
has been expressed in a culture of minimal state and 
government - but in practice, such culture, when 
embossing implemented reforms, seldom reverted 
the role of the state, destroyed social safety nets, and 
placed the tax burden on the working majority rather 
than on the wealthy elite; ii) advocates for NPM have 
Western-shaped minds, generally making erroneous 
assumptions about institutions and cultures, which 
may be present in Anglo-American countries, but 
not in other culturally different ones; iii) in practice, 
NPM reforms were imposed to low-income countries 
by donor institutions to adjust their states for 
good governance - but those reforms did not solve 
problems with inefficiency and corruption. This work 
is original and valuable because it shows that even 
when public policies highlight the importance of less 
state intervention, solid norms and institutions are 
always necessary, and because it helps demystifying 
discourses that simply put that less state/more market 
politics can be valuable everywhere.
Keywords: governance; Rational Choice Theory; New 
Public Management; neoliberalism.
Resumo: Este artigo objetiva estudar a New Public 
Management (NPM), uma das principais tendências 
associadas ao neoliberalismo. Estuda a governança 
para mostrar seu escopo mais geral, amplo e abstrato. 
Também se concentra na Escolha Racional como uma 
importante teoria sobre governança, uma base para 
a NPM. Por fim, observa os fundamentos neolibe-
rais da NPM, mostrando alguns aspectos críticos da 
sua prática real. Metodologia: método de pesquisa 
hipotético-dedutivo, com abordagem qualitativa e 
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crítica e técnica de pesquisa bibliográfico-documental. 
Como resultados, concluímos que: i) o uso ideológico 
da NPM tem sido expresso em uma cultura de estado 
mínimo e governo - mas, na prática, tal cultura, ao mo-
delar reformas, raramente reverteu o papel do Estado, 
destruiu as redes de segurança social e colocou a carga 
tributária sobre a maioria que trabalha, e não sobre a 
elite rica; ii) os defensores da NPM têm mentes oci-
dentalizadas, geralmente fazendo suposições errôneas 
sobre instituições e culturas que podem estar presen-
tes em países anglo-americanos, mas não em outros 
culturalmente diferentes; iii) na prática, as reformas 
da NPM foram impostas a países de baixa renda por 
instituições doadoras para ajustar seus estados à boa 
governança - mas essas reformas não resolveram 
problemas com ineficiência e corrupção. Este trabalho 
é original e valoroso ao mostrar que, mesmo quando 
políticas públicas destacam a importância de menos 
intervenção estatal, normas e instituições sólidas são 
sempre necessárias, e porque ajuda a desmitificar 
discursos que simplesmente colocam que menos Es-
tado/mais mercado pode ser uma valiosa tendência 
em todos os lugares.
Palavras-chave: governança; Teoria da Escolha Racio-
nal; Nova Gestão Pública; neoliberalismo.
Introduction
The new federal government that started in Brazil 
in 2019 was elected, among other several plans, promises 
and ideological lines, because of a very significative series 
of reforms in economy - being all of them mainly based on 
privatization, substitution of a social social security system 
of solidarity/contribution for a capitalization system, 
shrinkage of the state - “more Brazil, less Brasilia” (“mais 
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Brasil, menos Brasília”) was one of the most repeated mottos 
of its electioneering campaign - in favor of the market, 
simplification of the taxation system, among others. Of 
course this is only one contextual change in one country in 
all the western world - but it can illustrate how governments 
can still be elected because of an ideological change towards 
(neo)liberal trends still in 21st century, combined with 
populist right-wing promises.
It is not a goal of this work to make a moral evaluation 
of all these aspects, but to analyze one of the main tendencies 
in governance theory, that seems to create a basis for all those 
liberal ideas after 20th century: the Rational Choice school 
of governance, as well as one of its most prolific trends: the 
New Public Management (NPM) school. 
There are important interdisciplinary and social 
justifications for this study. In first place, for Law studies, this 
study can show that even when public policies highlight the 
importance of less state intervention - leaving the individual 
with a wider margin to act -, solid norms and institutions 
are always necessary (which involve a strong state in some 
manner). And it is also important for studies in public 
management and political science to demystify discourses 
that simply put that less state/more market politics can be 
a valuable trend everywhere, just because in some Anglo-
American countries it was well succeeded in a recent past.
The research problem that conduced this work can be 
written in these terms: which relationships can be identified 
between the ideas of governance, rational choice and New 
Public Management (NPM)? As the main hypothesis to that 
problem, it can be posted that NPM has emerged as a very 
important trend in public management in the second half 
of the 20th Century, and it is based in ideas of less state and 
more market leading in conducing public issues, such as 
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services. It has been a response to strategies that supposedly 
took public managements around the world to a crisis during 
the 1970s because of the erosion of Welfare State (which was 
characterized by a very high level of intervention of the State 
in the Economy and in service offering, among other things), 
highly influenced by rational choice theory - which, by its 
turn, was created in the intersection between Political studies 
and Economy. However, although the idea of governance 
was spread around the world in consonance with the ideas 
of NPM, the first one is a much more abstract and wider 
idea that simply rational choice, neoliberalism or even NPM.
The general objective of this article is to study in a 
critical perspective the NPM, which is one of the main 
political trends associated to neoliberal ideology. In order to 
do so, we enlisted three specific objectives, being that each 
one of them is corresponding to a subsequent part of the text. 
Firstly, to study in a general perspective a definition about 
governance, in order to show that it has a general and abstract 
scope, wider than simply one or another trend about public 
management. Secondly, it is necessary to focus on the rational 
choice, as it is an important theory about governance - which 
was the basis to the development of NPM. And in third - and 
last - place, we observed the neoliberal foundations of NPM, 
showing some critical aspects it presented in its real practice.
Methodologically, this work was conduced through 
a hypothetical-deductive method of research, with a 
qualitative and critical approach. Its research technique is 
bibliographic-documental, based mainly in political science 
scholar works.
1. Governance: general overview
Generally, governance is the act or the manner of 
governing. It “is a term used to describe the making of 
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public policy and the delivery of public goods in modern 
states following the rise of the new right, the development 
of new public management, public sector reform, and 
globalization”. 3 Thus, governance refers to several new 
practices and theories of governing, and the dilemmas they 
provoke. Some of these theories place less emphasis on the 
state and hierarchies, and more on markets and networks.4 
But it does not mean that state and hierarchies have lost their 
importance with those new theories, practices and dilemmas: 
“[…] theories of governance typically open up the black box 
of the state. [They] undermine reified concepts of the state 
as a monolithic entity, interest, or actor”.5
Governance can describe the relationship between 
the state and civil society; mainly that the state does not 
dominate public policy making. Academic and political 
interest in governance and the state derive from neoliberal 
reforms of the public sector since the 1980s6. For example, 
public governance is related to reforms that led to a shift 
from hierarchic bureaucracy towards a consideration of 
markets and networks as having a greater importance in the 
public sector.7 Globalization has also impacted how states 
3 SMITH, M. Pluralism. In: HAY, C.; LISTER, M.; MARSH, D. (eds.). The State: 
Theories and Issues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 21-38; p. 31.
4 BEVIR, Mark. Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma In BEVIR, Mark 
(ed.). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: 
SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 1-16; p. 1.
5 BEVIR, Mark. Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma In BEVIR, Mark 
(ed.). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: 
SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 1-16; p. 1.
6 BEVIR, Mark. Governance. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia 
Britannica, inc. Available in:https://www.britannica.com/topic/governance. 
Access in: 13 May 2019.
7 BEVIR, Mark. What is governance? In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). Public governance. 
Volume 1. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007, 
p. xxi-xliv; p. xxi.
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and international actors address global or regional issues, 
such as transnational economies and regional agreements 
like the European Union (EU). Thus, global governance is 
related to a political cooperation between transnational and 
international actors and organizations to address complex 
issues that no one nation can resolve on its own, such as 
climate change, development, or conflict resolution and 
security. These dilemmas which require coordination and 
cooperation from different stakeholders and different policy 
arenas are called “wicked issues”.8
There are some general characteristics to the theories 
and practices related to governance since the 1980s. In the 
first place, it can be said that governance pays attention 
to complex interactions and processes of patterns of rule, 
deviating the focus from state institutions to several other 
activities, organizations and entities - and this deviation 
blur the boundary between state and its environment, in 
a very unconventional manner. In other words, hybrid 
administrative arrangements are conceived in those new 
theories: the combination of administrative systems, markets, 
and non-profit organizations are typically approached, as 
well as new mixes of public and private (and very often, 
purely private) in regulation are developed.9
A second distinctive trace of new theories of governance 
is its multi jurisdictional and transnational character, 
according to which the current patterns of governance 
8 Wicked issues defined as “complex, contested problems of interest to 
multiple policy actors and which require addressing them from different 
policy domains” (HAWKINS, B.;ALVAREZ-ROSETE, A. Role of the State in 
Public Health Policy. In QUAH, Stella R. (ed.). International Encyclopedia of 
Public Health. Amsterdam; London: Academic Press, 2017, p. 407).
9 BEVIR, Mark. Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma In BEVIR, Mark 
(ed.). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: 
SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 1-16; p. 2.
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combine institutions and people of diverse levels and sectors 
of government (international, national, regional, and local).
A third distinctive feature of governance theories is 
the plurality of stakeholders - which can be described as 
decurrent of i) increasing use of third-party organizations 
delivering state services; ii) the explosion of advocacy groups 
(related to several causes interesting to civil society); iii) the 
expansion and new prominence of philanthropy. All those 
causes led to the emergence of new institutional designs 
and practices, such as collaborative governance and public-
private partnerships.10
New theories about governance stipulate problems for 
a representative democracy - which is strongly attached to 
developmental narratives of the nineteenth century, such as 
liberty, individualism, and the state as safeguards to contain 
contingency and contestation. But that developmental 
historicism started its collapse in the beginning of the 
twentieth century (before the World Wars), when political 
scientists began to focus on political and voting behavior. 
After World War I, political scientists, interest groups, and 
bureaucracies suffered an increasing interest by scientists, 
as well as a pluralist analysis of the state, the considerations 
of class struggle by socialists - parameters that debunked 
the belief in a uniform conception of the nation, state, and 
common good (and all these new focuses represented a shift 
from the parameters of the previous century). Moreover, 
when Rational Choice Theory began its rise between 
scholars, its microlevel foundations also continued exposing 
the absurdity of beliefs in the uniformity between institutions 
(such as nations and states), implying that individuals act 
10 BEVIR, Mark. Governance as theory, practice, and dilemma In BEVIR, Mark 
(ed.). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: 
SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 1-16; p. 2.
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according to self-interest - even when occupying positions in 
the state and administration -, also debunking the myth in a 
common good as a main guide for action in state’s agenda.11
There are two sides of the new governance: theoretically, 
it has been something like a stimulus of theories that 
emphasized less on formal authority and institutions; and 
in practice, some of its aspects have resulted from those 
new theories, being that the new theories have been used 
as attempts to reform the state - sometimes, making it seem 
like a result of a natural development of things. But new 
governance is not a natural development: it is “a result 
of sustained theoretical (or even ideological) advocacy by 
intellectuals and policy makers”.12
By now, we can identify that governance is a theoretical 
concept that overcomes (without putting aside) formal 
government - and new theories about governance reflect 
constantly that characteristic. They overflow the traditional 
scope of the State and its structures, but it does not mean 
they do not considerate the importance of State institutions, 
structures and hierarchies: they only take into account a 
much wider scope of institutions and structures, in which 
the State is inserted. That wider scope is compound by both 
public and private actors; national and transnational, also; 
finally, local and global.
The next section discusses the economic theory that 
formed the basis of the neoliberal ideology of governance 
and public management, rational choice theory. Then, 
the governance debate of the first wave, and a global 
11 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 39-40.
12 BEVIR, Mark. Theories of Governance In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). Public governance. 
Volume 1. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007, p. 
xlv-lxii; p. xlv.
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phenomenon called New Public Management (NPM). This 
governance trend focused on economic principles mentioned 
above, such as the “rational self-interested” model and cost-
benefits analysis. It is this reform of government that was 
based on a neoliberal ideology.
2. Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice is simultaneously a method and a 
theory about how societal or governing processes work.13 
This generates questions about the social world, providing 
some standard techniques up to answer those questions. 
Its methods mainly include formal modeling techniques 
originated from social choice theory and games theory. 
Theoretically, it is based on an economic model of a “self-
interested wealth-maximizing” individual. 
In political science, rational choice combine those 
techniques with economics, from which its intellectual 
heritage comes, assuming that individuals are able to order 
their preferences over states, based on their interests.14 In 
13 DOWDING, Keith. Rational choice theory In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). The SAGE 
Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
2011, p. 36-50; p. 36-37.
14 It assumes that individuals can order their preferences over states of the 
world (or ‘objects’)  with the base relation ‘R’. We define an ‘R’ relation as one 
where the agent either prefers the first alternative to the other or is indifferent 
between them, and it can be read as ‘at least as good as’. Rational choice 
theory is defined by three conditions concerned with preferences which are 
required for rationalizing or interpreting the behavior of agents. Preferences 
must be reflexive, complete and transitive. The first condition means for 
any alternative x within a domain A an individual I  either prefers or is 
indifferent between x  and itself (for all x ∈ A, x Rix). The second condition, 
completeness, is that any item in domain A must enter into the preference 
ordering so that for all alternatives x, y ∈ A, either x Rix y or y x Rix (or both) 
(in other words either individual I  prefers y to x or is indifferent between 
them). The final condition means for any triple of alternatives x, y, z ∈ A, if x 
Riy and y Rix and y Riz , then x Riz (which means that if i weakly prefers x to 
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other words, this method attempts to explain a social behavior 
done by the individual, the rational actor or agent. It unpacks 
patterns of rule, institutions and social facts in general, 
according to analyses of individuals in activity, modeling 
individual actions assuming that they adopt the course of 
action according to their rational preferences.15 The greater 
development of rational choice theory happened during the 
1960s and 1970s, as concerns about the expansion of the state, 
stagflation, budget deficits, and several peripheral analyses 
of modern “ungovernability” of the state and of inefficien 
cies caused by political-business cycle16 were also growing.17 
Microlevel emphasis on individual rationality turns 
the efficiency of the markets into the broadly accepted 
main coordinator/allocator of resources - but it is very 
important to highlight that such markets can only operate 
in a context qualified by suitable laws and norms (including 
rules that enforce contracts). Thus, many rational choice 
theorists conceive the problem of governance by explaining 
the emergence of those suitable laws and norms. But the 
predominance of the micro level analysis makes it harder 
to take origins, persistence and effects of norms/laws for 
y and to z, then I must weakly prefer x to z). These conditions allow for the 
weak axiom of revealed preference (WARP) which enables rationalization, 
interpretation and explanation of behavior (DOWDING, Keith. Rational 
choice theory In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). The SAGE Handbook of Governance. Los 
Angeles; London; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2011, p. 36-50; p. 36).
15 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 40.
16 This is defined as a period before a re-election, where the incumbent 
implements economic policies to increase the likelihood of being re-elected. 
Sometimes, these policies aren’t just economic like tax cuts, they could also 
be capital projects to spur the economy, like building a new road or school. 
17 DOWDING, Keith. Rational choice theory In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). The SAGE 
Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
2011, p. 36-50; p. 38.
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granted. That theory does not explain the rise and stability 
of law and order when there is no higher authority present, 
and consequently, rational actors can break the laws if it 
is in their interests to do so. So, rational choice theorists 
conclude that such absence means that institutions must be 
self-enforcing.18
2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalism employs some 
important logical elements belonging to rational choice 
theory itself - such as individual rationality and utility. The 
basic assumption of that kind of institutionalism is that 
individuals act, in relation to the institutions they occupy (or 
communicate with) maximizing their own personal interests 
(which are, in this sense, exogenous). Then, with all those 
strong exogenous interests brought by individuals, designers 
of institutions could achieve institutional intentions simply 
by creating adequate combinations of incentives and 
disincentives.19
Rational choice institutionalism focus its attention 
mainly on the effects of laws, norms and institutions on the 
actions of the individuals. Theorists  argue that the strategic 
actions of people are structured by institutions.  This theory 
came about after studying legislators in U.S Congress in the 
1970s,20 meaning that if each actor were behaving in his/
18 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 41.
19 PETERS, B. Guy. Institutional theory In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). The SAGE 
Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
2011, p. 78-90; p. 80.
20 Hall, P. A. and Taylor, R. C. R. (1996) ‘Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms’, in. Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, Kohn, 
Germany, pp. 1–32. Available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp96-
6.pdf (Accessed: 20 March 2016).
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her own interest, then many bills would not find a majority. 
They found an answer in institutions, because of the way 
procedures and committees are structured in Congress - and 
this provides and structures the choices and information 
presented to the legislators. This lowers the transaction 
costs21 for legislators so they can engage in deal-making.22 
Thus, stable institutions can give the individuals reasonable 
expectations about outcomes of several manners of acting, 
from which they have to choose. In this sense, the ways 
institutions create expectations about adequate consequences 
are examined by rational choice institutionalists.23 They often 
think that the global forces (which erode state capacities) 
are inexorably resultant of a social logic of specialization, 
according to which, “as society becomes more complex, 
reciprocal independence becomes the most common 
relationship among actors”.24 However, weak institutions 
(or nations with weak institutions) face high transaction 
costs, as these cannot give individuals reasonable certainty 
regarding expectations and consequences. This would 
create an unstable environment where actors can break the 
rules without penalty. An example of this would be the 
international system,25 where global governance has no 
21 A transaction cost is an economic tern for any costs that occurs during a 
social interaction or economic exchange. According to North, these can be 
measurement, enforcement, ideological attitudes and perceptions, and the 
size of the market. So, for example, there is a transaction cost in enforcing 
a contract (legal costs). North, D. C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change 
and Economic Performance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
22 Ibid. Hall and Taylor.
23 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 47.
24 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 49.
25 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 41-42
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hierarchy and enforcement mechanisms are weak.
Even though rational choice theory is an organizing 
perspective and a way of analyzing politics, it makes no 
specific recommendations about governance structures. 
It also does not have theories about governance or new 
modes of service delivery. However, it is used to model 
problems that arise in new forms of governance, helping 
providing normative critique (or justification) for them.26 
Much of political science and governance studies have been 
dominated by rational choice-based models and analyses for 
the last four decades, and these are some of its impacts below.
An important first impact that can be enlisted here 
is about the contingency of human behavior. The main 
contribution rational choice theory provides is that behavior 
is organized around maximizing wealth or preferences of 
the individual, and thus, there is an assumption that these 
preferences are static and all behaviors are strategic and 
highly calculated to achieve these ends.27 However, there 
are many example in politics, especially in voting, that 
demonstrate not all decisions are highly strategic or even 
well-informed, as in the case of the U.K.’s 2016 referendum 
on Brexit.28 But giving information to voters does affect 
selection of candidates.29 In addition, given the highly 
26 DOWDING, Keith. Rational choice theory In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). The SAGE 
Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
2011, p. 36-50; p. 36-37.
27 HALL, P. A.; TAYLOR, R. C. R. Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms. Köln: Max-Planck-Institut fur Gesellschaftsforschung, 
1996, p. 1–32. Available at: http://www.mpifg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp96-6.pdf. 
Access in: 13 May 2019.
28 ENGLISH, O. The British public still have no idea what they voted for with 
Brexit – it’s not elitist to admit it. The Independent, 22 January 2019. Available 
at: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-theresa-may-leave-voters-
remain-eu-referendum-campaign-deal-a8740526.html. Access in: 13 May 
2019.
29 PANDE, R. Can informed voters enforce better governance? Experiments in 
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complex nature of human beings, it is a flaw to assume that 
these preferences are the same, or to be able to assume what 
the preferences of these individuals are, given cultural or 
religious barriers.
The second impact we highlight is about high 
inefficiency in allocating some goods (which can be 
understood through the free riding problem). In the social 
sciences, the free rider problem occurs when one or more 
persons benefit from common or public goods without 
having to pay for them. Public goods or common goods are 
economic terms to define resources that are not excludable, 
such as clean air or grass for a farmer to let his cattle graze.30 
Clean air is a public good because it is non excludable and 
non rivalrous, meaning anyone can benefit from breathing 
clean air, and many people can breathe the same air (non 
rivalrous). However, grass is rivalrous as two cows cannot 
eat the same pile of grass or fisheries, as two persons 
cannot catch the same fish. So, these are called common or 
communal goods; non excludable but rivalrous.
Free riding presents an economic inefficiency, if an 
actor feels that someone else is benefiting without incurring 
a cost, then she or he may not want to contribute as much. 
This can lead to the underproduction of these goods and 
overconsumption of the goods too. Rational choice and 
subsequent models, such as public choice theory, predict 
these collective action problems. However, there is rarely a 
solution within these models to solve them, since the actor 
will behave in his or her preferences. 
low-income democracies. Annual Review of Economics, v. 3, n. 1, p. 215-237, 
2011.
30 BROUSSEAU, E.; DEDEURWAERDERE, T. Global Public Goods: 
The Part icipatory Governance Challenges in: BROUSSEAU, E.; 
DEDEURWAERDERE, T.; SIEBENHÜNER, (eds.). Reflexive Governance 
for Global Public Goods. London: MIT Press, 2012, p. 21–36.
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The third contribution brought by rational choice 
theory is about long-term cooperation. Assuming that 
people act rationally according to their own interests even 
when occupying positions within the state, rational choice 
theorists have to explain how political and social order can 
be stable, given that people could break such orders if it is 
in their interests to do so. An explanation often given is that 
an authority creates incentives and disincentives, so people 
include sustaining such order within their interests too31 - 
however, that explanation does not answer the question of 
how orders are maintained stable when a higher authority 
is absent, which leads to this question: how can a higher 
authority arise in the first place?32
Generally those theorists conclude that the only way of 
preventing the tragedy of the commons33 is the establishment 
of a system of coercion that is mutually accepted - as coercion 
acts as a corrective feedback mechanism that ensures honesty 
in the population. Even when coercion restricts freedom 
(or even when it is not equitable/just), it would be the only 
alternative to social instability (or even ruin).34
Since the rational choice model only explains behavior 
in a competitive environment for private goods, is not a 
31 BEVIR, Mark. Theories of Governance In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). Public governance. 
Volume 1. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007, p. 
xlv-xlvii.
32 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 42.
33 Tragedy of the Commons is a metaphoric concept to describe a situation 
of a shared resource, where every individual acts to his or her own self-
interest, but this has a long-term negative impact on the common good, 
usually the depletion of the shared resource. This is usually cited in works 
with sustainable development or environmental or conservation efforts 
(OSTRÖM, E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
34 BEVIR, Mark. New Theories In BEVIR, Mark. Democratic Governance. 
Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 39-65; p. 43.
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broad theory to explain every behavior or decision of all 
individuals35. For example, in a situation where there are 
limited natural resources in a community, such as fisheries, 
each individual acting to maximize his or her self-interests 
would lead to overexploitation. In the short-term this may 
provide some gratification, but could be devastating in the 
long-term if these natural resources were depleted. Thus, 
would it be rational for an individual to maximize his or her 
opportunities for short-term gratification? Or cooperate with 
community members to share the resources judiciously, so 
that they will not deplete?
In another example, regarding election cycle, the 
rational choice model may actually be undemocratic. The 
short electoral cycles can encourage the rational choice 
of “short-term gratification” as politicians will only be 
concerned with surviving the next campaign cycle and 
not the policies that extend beyond them.36 Thus, laws 
and policies put in place by politicians may not benefit the 
communities in the long-term but are only meant to boost 
a candidate’s popularity for the next campaign cycle. A 
common example is pork barreling in American politics. This 
is the appropriation of funds to a legislator’s district, solely 
to receive his or her vote on a bill. The funding may have 
absolutely nothing to do with the contents of the bill, but is 
simply to win his or her vote.37 This is where some scholars, 
who argue that this is a “big welfare state” and say that this 
is “inefficiency” may lead to a type of state failure.
35 OSTRÖM, E. Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex 
Economic Systems. American Economic Review, v. 100, n. 3, p. 641–672, 2010.
36 BALDWIN, K. The Paradox of Traditional Chiefs in Democratic Africa. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015.
37 BICKERS, Kenneth N.; STEIN, Robert M. The Congressional Pork Barrel in 
a Republican Era. The Journal of Politics, v. 62, n. 4, p. 1070-1086, 2008.
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Rational choice theory (through two of its major 
branches, public choice and constitutional political economy) 
provide some superficial justification for new governance 
techniques of networks and markets. Both public choice 
and constitutional political economy defend markets 
and celebrate the complexity and diversity of such new 
institutional arrangements. 
However, rational choice analysis has revealed the 
instability (and the chaos) resulting of political formation 
without institutional structures that narrow broad sets 
of possibilities. It has specified strategic possibilities that 
groups and individuals may use when their understanding 
of aggregation mechanisms is better than others’. It also 
warns about the dangers of regulation when agencies capture 
regulators because of their own interests, and inequities 
and inefficiencies resulting from the diversity of groups’ 
mobilization problems. Those (between several other 
ones) make rational choice approach a way to criticize new 
governance systems.38
Public choice theory assumes that rational behavior 
is based on one’s knowledge of the situation.39 Individual 
preferences and free choice are central to this theory, and 
the social reality is assessed by the individual’s action, logic 
of the situation, and logic of the action. In other words, a 
“Native-American who believes that rain-dancing produces 
rain and who begins to dance in a severe drought is behaving 
rationally.”40 This is theory, which is based on rational actor 
38 DOWDING, Keith. Rational choice theory In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). The SAGE 
Handbook of Governance. Los Angeles; London; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
2011, p. 36-50; p. 46.
39 GRUENING, G. Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management. 
International Public Management Journal, v. 4, p. 1–25, 2001.
40 GRUENING, G. Origin and theoretical basis of New Public Management. 
International Public Management Journal, v. 4, p. 1–25, 2001, p. 5.
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model, is also one of the leading theories for a popular 
governance model called New Public Management.
3. Neoliberalism, New Public Management 
(NPM) and Governance
The ideological usage of new governance has been 
expressed as a political culture of the minimal state and less 
government. In practice, however, social scientists often 
concluded that the neoliberal reforms of the public sector 
seldom reverted the role of state institutions, but rather 
destroyed social safety nets, such as healthcare and education 
and in the United States (U.S) in particular, placed the tax 
burden on the working majority rather than the wealthy 
elite.41 The result is an empty rhetoric of “less government” 
in governance, and the consequences of the reforms can be 
expressed as fragmented service delivery and weakened 
central control without the establishment of proper markets.42
NPM is a concept that has many theoretical roots and 
can be traced as far back as the post-World War II era in the 
U.S.43 The theories (public choice and principal-agent)44 imply 
41 NAVARRO, V. Neoliberalism as a Class Ideology: Or, The Political Causes of 
the Growth of Inequalities in: NAVARRO, V. (ed.). Neoliberalism, Globalization, 
and Inequalities: Consequences for Health and Quality of Life. Amityville: 
Baywood Publishing Company, 2007, p. 9–23.
42 BEVIR, Mark. What is governance? In BEVIR, Mark (ed.). Public governance. 
Volume 1. London; Thousand Oaks; New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2007, 
p. xxi-xliv; p.xxiv.
43 HOOD, C. A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration, 
v. 69, n. 1, p. 3-19, 1991.
44 In principal-agent theory, we have the Principal (or multiple Principals) that 
may have certain interests: like share-holders of a pharmaceutical company, 
donors to a charity or fund, or member states of the EU. The Agent is tasked 
with executing services or acts for the Principal(s); however, according to 
Grossman & Hart (1983) an agency problem can develop if the Agent has an 
agenda that differs from the Principal(s) and decides to pursue his/her own 
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transferring to political theory and public administration, 
the methods and principles of neoclassical economics. These 
principles rely on radical logical-deductive and abstract, 
rather than historical-deductive character; and the economic 
agents are, rightly so, about maximizing the markets (and 
not public interests/goods). In the case of political behavior, 
the maximization of self-interest is universally accepted.45 
The popularity of NPM rose after the 1973-1974 oil 
shocks and the subsequent recession in the early 1980s; the 
“welfare state and its intrusive policies” were blamed for 
the crisis46. The rise in new-right administrations in the U.S 
(President Regan) and the United Kingdom (U.K) (Prime 
Minister Thatcher) led the movement for government 
reforms. According to Miller & Dunn (2006), the original 
principles of NPM are not defined from a single theory 
but seen “as practical solutions to operational problems 
interests instead.
 For example, in a perfect two-party democratic system, if voters (Principals) 
had full knowledge of the politician’s (Agent) platform and intentions then 
they would choose based on those that closely align to the political values 
and legislation of their own preference (Lane 2013). Thus, this implies that 
extreme right-wing or left-wing candidates would not have been elected in a 
fair election had voters had all the information regarding the political agent 
(GROSSMAN, S.; HART, O. An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. 
Econometrica, v. 51, n. 1, p. 7-45, 1983;
 LANE, J.-E. The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation 
and Public Policy-Making. Open Journal of Political Science, v. 3, n. 2, p. 85–89, 
2013).
45 BRESSER-PEREIRA, L. C. Theoretical Approaches to New Public 
Management. In BRESSER-PEREIRA, L. C. (ed.). Democracy and Public 
Management Reform: Building the Republican State. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004.
46 LARBI, G. A. (1999). The New Public Management Approach and Crisis 
States. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 
1999. Available at: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxP
ages)/5F280B19C6125F4380256B6600448FDB/$file/dp112.pdf. Access in: 13 
May 2019.
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confronting governments”47. These principles were generated 
as remedies to a “broken system of government” where state 
institutions were viewed as undemocratic, unresponsive, 
inefficient and failing in other categories that are used to 
measure an efficient organization. Specifically, the reforms 
attempted to make governments function more “efficiently” 
and even “entrepreneurially,” like a business48. This was 
an attempt to reinvent the state and distinguish “steering” 
(policy decisions) which is what a modern state needed 
more of, rather than “rowing” (service delivery), which it 
needed less of.
3.1 Neoliberal Foundations
NPM became popular as an academic and then 
policy discourse, however the ideology behind it to justify 
government reforms was neoliberalism.49 For example, 
an argument of the “big and intrusive” government was 
called “state failure”. Hindmoor describes this as a parallel 
concept of market failure, where markets are imperfect and 
47 MILLER D. Y.; DUNN, W. N. A Critical Theory of New Public Management, 
2006. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1
.1.125.4697&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Accessed in: 13 May 2019, p. 3.
48 VAN KERSBERGEN, K.; VAN WAARDEN, F. (2004). “Governance” as a 
bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts 
in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy. 
European Journal of Political Research, v. 43, n. 2, p. 143-171, 2004.
49 BESSANT, S. E. F.; ROBINSON, Z. P.; ORMEROD, R. M. Neoliberalism, 
new public management and the sustainable development agenda of 
higher education: history, contradictions and synergies. Environmental 
Education Research, v. 21, n. 3, p. 417-432, 2015.; CONNELL, R.; FAWCETT, B.; 
MEAGHER, G. Neoliberalism, New Public Management and the human 
service professions: Introduction to the Special Issue. Journal of Sociology, v. 
45, n. 4, p. 331–338, 2009; URIO, P. China, the West and the Myth of New Public 
Management: Neoliberalism and its Discontents. New York, NY: Routledge, 
2012.
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sometimes the state needs to intrude (bring in regulations). 
However, scholars argue that the state is imperfect and 
thus some services (like education or health) should be 
privatized so citizens can have a greater say or another 
choice in the market.50 Some forms of state failure include 
rent-seeking, political business cycles, vote swapping, and 
budget-maximizing.
NPM is broadly shaped by free market or liberal 
economic principles, such as competition. Thus, once services 
are delivered through privatization, there will be greater 
and (ideally) better options for consumers (citizens). So, in 
some areas, governments try to stimulate competition (a bid 
for contracts, for example), rather than replicate markets.51 
However, governments may not always get a perfect 
outcome on demand and supply, when trying to stimulate 
competition and therefore may be inefficient52 by raising 
transaction costs.
Steering is a less invasive government, where services 
are no longer delivered by the government, but policies were 
created to “guide” local governments and private actors.53 As 
a result, many industries were privatized or outsourced to 
contractors as well as quasi-markets of joint public-private 
50 HINDMOOR, A. Public Choice in: HAY, C.; LISTER, M.; MARSH, D. (eds.) 
The State: Theories and Issues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (Political 
Analysis), 2006, p. 79–97.
51 O’FLYNN, J. From New Public Management to Public Value: Paradigmatic 
Change and Managerial Implications. The Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, v. 66, n. 3, p.  353-366, 2007.
52 O’FLYNN, J. From New Public Management to Public Value: Paradigmatic 
Change and Managerial Implications. The Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, v. 66, n. 3, p.  353-366, 2007.
53 VAN KERSBERGEN, K.; VAN WAARDEN, F. (2004). “Governance” as a 
bridge between disciplines: Cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts 
in governance and problems of governability, accountability and legitimacy. 
European Journal of Political Research, v. 43, n. 2, p. 143-171, 2004.
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partnerships initiatives (JPPPIs) were formed.54 However, 
these moves did not lower costs, but may have increased 
them; agents can “shirk55 under long-term contracting 
arrangements, so alternatives ways for agents to engage in 
opportunism exist under short- term contracting, all allowing 
for agents to pretend they are better than they really are”.56 
Steering, rather than providing services directly 
(“rowing”) can also have problems with accountability, 
transparency, and even a political cost. In terms of 
accountability, with a stakeholder net casted so widely, it 
may be difficult for the public to know who is accountable 
especially when services and goods are delivered poorly.57 
Thus, NPM may address operational or administrative 
accountability measures (with incentives and deterrents) 
however, not political accountability.58
Originally, many of these ideals came from the 
business sector and therefore had a “universal appeal” to be 
54 GREENWOOD, D. Governance, Coordination, and Evaluation The Case for 
an Epistemological Focus and a Return to C. E. Lindblom. Political Research 
Quarterly, v. 69, n. 1, p. 30-42, 2016.
55 Shirk or shirking means when an Agent intentionally avoid executing 
delegated duties or functions that it was contracted to do on behalf of the 
Principal(s) (KAMRADT-SCOTT, A. Managing Global Health Security: The 
World Health Organization and Disease Outbreak Control. London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2015).
56 LANE, J.-E. The Principal-Agent Approach to Politics: Policy Implementation 
and Public Policy-Making. Open Journal of Political Science, v. 3, n. 2, p. 85–89, 
2013, p. 88.
57 BLUESTONE, K.; HEATON, A.; LEWIS, C. Beyond Philanthropy: the 
pharmaceutical industry, corporate social responsibility, and the developing 
world. London: VSO; Save the Children; and Oxfam, 2002. Available at: 
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Beyond_
Philanthropy_1.pdf. Accessed in: 13 May 2019.
58 FATEMI, M.; BEHMANESH, M. R. New Public Management Approach and 
Accountability. International Journal of Management, Economics, and Social 
Sciences, v. 1, n. 2, p. 42-49, 2012.
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incorporated in any government or public administration.59 
However, there are contextual differences in how the public 
and private sector operate. The business sector is based on a 
model of for-profits and not public goods, so some concepts, 
such as collaboration or public interest do not exist in this 
framework. NPM is limited in terms of transferring private-
sector strategies into the public sector.60
Advocators for NPM support a democratic and 
pluralist style of governance, but in practice, conflict 
can evolve when actors have divergent interests. NPM’s 
theoretical underpinnings, based on economic costs and 
self-interest, do not have a sufficient way on how to resolve 
these conflicts in the public sector. Additionally, although 
these policies have helped to depoliticize some issues (such 
as health or education), they did not actually negate the 
fact that resources are politically determined. An agent’s 
incentive can be motivated by politics or self-interests but 
obscured through a loosely networked bureaucracy. In 
other words, NPM not only failed to make the public sector 
more efficient, but also failed to address other problems, like 
corruption and transparency.
As a state failure, rent-seeking or budget maximization 
are ways that the state or actors within the state, are able 
to increase power and wealth while producing little social 
efficiency.61 Retrenching the state, via NPM reforms, and 
leaving more services to the free market were supposed 
to correct these failures. However, some governments or 
59 HOOD, C. A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration, 
v. 69, n. 1, p. 3-19, 1991.
60 MONGKOL, K. The Critical Review of New Public Management Model and 
its Criticisms. Research Journal of Business Management, v. 5, n. 1, p. 35-43, 2011.
61 HINDMOOR, A. Public Choice in: HAY, C.; LISTER, M.; MARSH, D. (eds.) 
The State: Theories and Issues. New York: Palgrave Macmillan (Political 
Analysis), 2006, p. 79–97.
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heads of state are worried about being seen as corrupt and 
make efforts to appear anti-corrupt, but individuals who are 
offered thousands of dollars by private companies do not 
share that same concern. A deregulated market means that 
states no longer have oversight, investigatory, or auditing 
of institutions and companies.
In addition, cost-effectiveness and outputs are 
emphasized rather than inputs (collecting bribes) or the 
process (receiving kickbacks from contractors) or social 
impact (pollution). This means that success or failure is 
determined by time and money (outputs), and not by the 
other factors. If services are delivered in a way that is not 
cost-efficient (for consumers and producers), it could be seen 
as a failing program, even if the services provided are in the 
public’s interest. Or if it is delivered in a cost-effective way, it 
could be viewed as successful even if it was not in the public’s 
interest62. This type of evaluation leaves out some important 
issues to consider, such as corruption or democratization.
3.2 Building the State with Neoliberalism
There are some critiques about how NPM is a Western-
style movement that makes some assumptions about the 
institutions and culture that may be present in the U.S, 
Australia, or the U.K, but not necessarily in Africa, Latin 
America or Asia. NPM-style reforms were imposed in 
many low-income countries by donor institutions such as 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to adjust 
the state for “good governance.”63 Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
62 HOOD, C. A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration, 
v. 69, n. 1, p. 3-19, 1991.
63 LARBI, G. A. The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States. Geneva: 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1999. Available 
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was more impacted than other regions of the world for 
length and depth of reforms it adopted.64 However, NPM 
had not fixed the problems with inefficiency and corruption 
that donors thought it would; first there was an assumption 
that there is an efficient market and private sector. Second, 
the strong patronage system present in some countries 
undermined benefits to be derived from contracting out, 
instead, it simply moved corruption to the private sector.65 
And since NPM is market-oriented, public services are using 
“market niche seeking” behavior where they are gearing 
their services towards those with the ability to pay and not 
where the greatest needs are. The disparity of services, such 
as health, education, and sanitation, affects poor countries 
the most;66 power and wealth is highly concentrated in the 
urban capitals, which leaves the vast rural poor with few 
options. In some cases, good services and facilities that were 
conduced by specialized technicians (such as sanitation) had 
that personnel substituted by professional managers and 
for-profit practices and values.67
at: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/5F280B19
C6125F4380256B6600448FDB/$file/dp112.pdf. Access in: 13 May 2019, p. 65.
64 GODDARD, Andrew; MKASIWA, Tausi Ally. New public management and 
budgeting practices in Tanzanian Central Government: “Struggling for 
conformance”. Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, v. 6, n. 4, p.340-
371, 2016. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1108/JAEE-03-2014-0018. Accessed 
in: 13 May 2019.
65 LARBI, G. A. The New Public Management Approach and Crisis States. Geneva: 
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1999. Available 
at: http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/5F280B19
C6125F4380256B6600448FDB/$file/dp112.pdf. Access in: 13 May 2019.
66 SCAFF, Elisangela Alves da Silva; SOUZA, Kellcia Rezende; PAXE, Isaac. 
Implications of the New Public Management in Education: Comparative 
Analysis between Brazil and Angola. Education Policy Analysis Archives, v. 
26, n. 129, October 15, p. 1-31, 2018.
67 VAN ROOYEN, Carina. New public management as a mechanism of 
accumulation by dispossession: The case of a public bulk water provider 
in South Africa in: HALVORSEN, Tor; IBSEN, Hilde; EVANS, Henri-Count; 
MATEUS DE OLIVEIRA FORNASIER E SABINE FRANKLIN 353
Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos | Belo Horizonte | n. 119 | pp. 327-362 | jul./dez. 2019
Finally, proponents of NPM claim that a free market-
based services would bring more democratic participation 
as citizens would have greater control and say, over 
services. However, an argument has been proposed that 
the marketization of services, such as health or education, 
have been undemocratic; especially to poor and vulnerable 
citizens as providers allocate goods and services to those 
who are most able to pay and as explain above, that tends 
to be in urban areas in low income countries.68 Although 
many countries that have adopted NPM-style reforms still 
perform democratic rituals, such as holding elections, with 
the rising influence of the private and third sector (nonprofit) 
in policy making, “there are often few lines of accountability 
tying these actors back to elected officials, and those few 
are too long to be effective,”69. In addition, even with the 
second wave of governance reforms (network governance 
or collaborative governance) there is no agreement on how 
to promote democracy.70
PENDERIS Sharon (eds.). Knowledge for justice: Critical perspectives from 
southern African-Nordic research partnerships. Cape Town; Bellville: 
African Minds; The Southern African-Nordic Centre, 2017, p. 71-92.
68 BEVIR, Mark. Governance. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia 
Britannica, inc. Available in:https://www.britannica.com/topic/
governance. Access in: 13 May 2019; LARBI, G. A. The New Public 
Management Approach and Crisis States. Geneva: United Nations Research 
Institute for Social Development, 1999. Available at: http://www.unrisd.
org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/5F280B19C6125F4380256B660044
8FDB/$file/dp112.pdf. Access in: 13 May 2019, p. 65; O’FLYNN, J. From New 
Public Management to Public Value: Paradigmatic Change and Managerial 
Implications. The Australian Journal of Public Administration, v. 66, n. 3, p. 
353-366, 2007.
69 BEVIR, Mark. Governance. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia 
Britannica, inc. Available in:https://www.britannica.com/topic/governance. 
Access in: 13 May 2019.
70 BEVIR, Mark. Governance. In Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia 
Britannica, inc. Available in:https://www.britannica.com/topic/governance. 
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Conclusion
After all the argumentation above, it is time to write 
some final considerations and conclusions about the 
researched subject. In first place, we have to conclude that 
governance is a much wider concept than government itself. 
It is an idea about relationships between the state and non-
state institutions, actors and networks, but without putting 
aside the importance of the state. Private and public, national 
and transnational, global and local actors, institutions and 
networks are studied by the several theories conceived inside 
the debate about governance.
 One of the most important theories about governance 
is the rational choice one. It focuses on the microlevel 
(individual rationality), and through that, we can affirm that 
the market is emphasized as the main allocator/coordinator 
of resources - but the theory also depends on a context 
qualified by adequate laws and norms to work (which, by its 
side, depends on state activities and power). But that theory 
does not explain the rise of stability, law and order when 
there is no higher authority present - thus, individuals can 
break the laws and norms if the consecution  their interests 
depends on that infractions.
 But it neither makes specific recommendations about 
governance structures; nor have theories about governance 
structures. It does not have theories about governance, or 
even new models of service delivery: it is only used to model 
problems that arise in new forms of governance, providing 
critique or justification for them - and it is important to 
highlight important consequences to political sciences 
brought by rational choice: 
Access in: 13 May 2019.
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1. It shows that behaviors are organized around 
maximizing individual wealth or preferences - but it also 
can provide an erroneous conclusion, according to which 
human preferences are static, and that every behavior are 
highly calculated to achieve these ends (when it is a current 
consensus shown by psychology and social sciences in 
general that human behavior is much more contingent and 
based on emotional, unconscious and cultural factors, as 
well as much more changeable than modern preconceptions 
assume).
2. Some economic problems about collective action, 
such as the free rider one, show an economic inefficiency 
of allocating resources, are predicted by rational choice 
theory - and this can lead to underproduction and/or 
overconsumption of those goods (including health and 
education services). But rational choice theorists rarely show 
a solution to those problems, as individual actors will always 
act according to their individual interests and preferences.
3. Rational choice theorists show that individuals 
will rationally act according to their own interests, even 
when occupying positions within the state, and this is a 
good impact to political theory, as it reveals the “black box 
of the state”. An explanation to this problem is given by 
the theory on this basis: state law and order must create 
incentives and disincentives (such as a system of coercion), 
then people would balance their interests/preferences 
including sustaining such order. But rational choice theory 
does not even explain how a higher authority arises, taken 
it by always present.
Rational choice theory is one of the basis on which 
a very significant trend of governance, the New Public 
Management (NPM), was erected - and the ideological 
usage of that new trend has been expressed in a culture of 
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minimal state (and consequently, less government). But in 
practice, social scientists often concluded that such culture, 
when embossing implemented reforms, seldom reverted the 
role of the state, and destroyed social safety nets, as well as 
placed the tax burden on the working majority rather than 
on the wealthy elite. Then, such rhetoric is expressible in 
fragmented service delivery and weakened central control 
without establishment of adequate (private) markets for 
offering those social services (such as education and health).
 It has also to be affirmed that advocates for NPM 
have Western-shaped minds - and they generally make 
erroneous assumptions about institutions and cultures, 
which may be present in Anglo-American countries, but 
not in Africa and Asia, for example. It has to be also shown 
that, in practice, NPM-style reforms were imposed to low-
income countries by donor institutions to adjust their states 
for good governance - but those reforms did not solve 
problems with inefficiency and corruption (making it even 
worse sometimes, as corruption started growing hugely in 
private sector also in those countries).
Disparity in essential services distribution also 
happened in those countries - where power and wealth are 
hugely concentrated in urban capitals. Consequently, vast 
rural poor populations were left with few options, as private 
companies offering those services would not install facilities 
near their places.
Finally, although many poor countries have adopted 
democratic institutions after the impassion of NPM-style 
reforms, the promotion of democracy after the continuity 
of such kind of reforms could not be verified.
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